

For confidence online

Disaster Recovery with DNSSEC

Stefan Ubbink | ICANN72 (virtual)

27 oct 2021



Agenda

- 1. Why this talk
- 2. Setup
- 3. Impact
- 4. Prevention
- 5. Improvements
- 6. Thanks
- 7. Questions



Why this talk

- HSM replacement with online KSK
- "What if..." scenarios
- Backups
- ... or not




Photo by cottonbro from Pexels



Setup


- 2 datacenters
- 1 active, 1 standby signer (hardware)
- 2 HSM's (HA, LB, networked)





Impact of lost keys

- Loss of service (no updates in the zone)
- Domains will fail when RRSIG expires
- New ZSK = DNSSEC signed zones unavailable for TTL DNSKEY+RRSIG
- ~60% validating resolvers in NL¹





Prevention

- Removing DS from parent
- Backups
- Fitting procedure



Photo by cottonbro from Pexels



Improvements


- RequireBackup setting for OpenDNSSEC
- AutomaticKeyGenerationPeriod with a good value
- Scheduled tickets for backup
- Longer Refresh time
- Shorter Resign time
- Time to react = Refresh Resign



Photo by cottonbro from Pexels



Impact of lost keys





Thanks



Berry van Halderen

• SIDN Colleagues



Are there any questions?



Follow us

- .nl SIDN.nl
- © @SIDN
- in SIDN

Thank you for your attention!

