DS Updates and Multi-Signer Coordination – A Continuing Series ICANN 72, “Seattle” – Episode 6

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Two gaps in the DNSSEC protocol specs

- Automation of DS updates
  - Periodic key changes
  - New key in the child's zone requires new parent DS record
  - Registrar has access to parent
    - If Registrar is providing signed DNS service, conveying new DS to parent is easy
  - **But 3rd party DNS provider does not have access to the Registry**

- Multiple DNS Providers
  - Each DNS provider signs with its own keys (RFC 8901 Model 2)
  - Each must include ZSKs from the other providers
  - No defined way to share the keys
  - Needed for:
    - **Capacity and high reliability**
    - **Glitch-free transfer of a signed zone from one DNS Provider to another (Disruptions can be worse than expected)**

Agenda

#	Title	Speaker
6.1	DNSSEC Provisioning Automation Overview	Steve Crocker, Shinkuro, Inc
6.2	Recent DNSSEC Automation Developments in .CZ	Jaromír Talíř, CZ.NIC
6.3	CDS & CDNSKEY Verification in Zonemaster	Mats Dufberg, Swedish Internet Foundation
6.4	Authentication Bootstrapping of DNSSEC Delegations	Peter Thomassen, deSEC
6.5	DNS Resolver Observatory	Pouyan Tehrani, Freie Universität Berlin
6.6	Introduction to CSYNC	Ulrich Wisser, Swedish Internet Foundation
6.7	Questions and Answers	

DS Updates

Possible Ways to Convey the DS key from 3rd party DNS Provider

	Direction	
Upper Side	Push (Calling) DNS Provider calls API at Ry, Rr	Pull (Polling) DNS Provider publishes CDS and/or CDNSKEY
Registry	1. Requires API	3. RFC 8078
Registrar	2. Requires API	4. RFC 8078



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

Possible Ways to Convey the DS key from 3rd party DNS Provider

	Direction	
Upper Side	Push (Calling) Call Rr or Rt API	Pull (Polling) Publish CDS/ CDNSKEY
Registry		
Registrar		4. RFC 8078



Registrar polls for CDS/CDNSKEY records.

Possible use forthcoming.

ccTLDs now implementing CDS/CDNSKEY Scanning



Actions, Rumors and Issues

- GoDaddy announced future scanning of customer zones
- Rumors of other registrars may do the same
- SSAC exploring recommendation of DS automation support

- Issue: Scanning is time-consuming. Doesn’t scale well

DNSSEC:
Multi-DNS Provider Coordination & Glitch-Free Provider Change

“Glitch-Free” = No loss of resolution AND no loss of validation

Multi-Signer Software Project

The Swedish Internet Foundation

deSEC

Salesforce

George Mason University

Neustar Security Services

Shinkuro, Inc.

Cross-Signing: Communicating ZSKs & KSKs



Registrant coordinates using a Multi-signer Coordinator

Multi-Signer Operational* Demonstrations

* Operational = Repeatable

- Adding a DNS operator
- Key rollover in one of the operations
- (Concurrent key rollover – will it work?)
- Removal of an operator
- Observation of glitch-free operation for each of the above

- Repeat of each, violating the timing constraints
- Observation of glitches when timing constraints are violated

Multi-Signer Big Picture

✓ Done
❑ In progress
○ Future
• Unspecified/Mixed

- ✓Protocol (RFC 8901)
- Software
  - Multi-Signer Controller
    - ❑ Design
    - ❑ Implementation
  - DNS Server Interfaces
    - ❑ BIND, PowerDNS, …
  - Services/Operations
    - ❑ deSEC, NS1, Neustar …
- Analysis
  - ✓Text
  - ○ Proof
- Observation
  - Longitudinal
  - Real-time
    - ○ System Design
    - ○ Deployment
    - ○ Experiments
      - ○ Positive
      - ○ Negative

Testbeds


Multi-Signer Controller
Blue
DNS
operator
hidden
master
public
slave
public
slave
Green
DNS
operator
hidden
master
public
slave
public
slave
Client
(resolver) A
Client
(resolver) B
Client
(resolver) C
DNS monitor

Multi-Signer Controller Components

- Interfaces to authoritative DNS servers
- Scenario sequencer
- User interface
  - Identities of authoritative servers
  - Credentials for access to the servers
  - Control to start, stop, undo transitions
- Module to check success of transitions
- Reporting
- Statistics

Multi-Signer Score Card

	Designed	In Progress	Done
Specifications	✓	**draft-wisser-dnssec-automation**	**RFC 8901 (Informational)**
Multi-Signer Controller	✓	✓	
Name Server Software Capabilities	✓	**Knot**	**PowerDNS, BIND**
DNS Service Provider Capabilities	✓	**NS1, Neustar**	**deSEC**
Documents			
Observation & Analysis			
Demonstrations			

Name Server Software Capabilities

14 Oct 2021	BIND			Knot			PowerDNS			(Others TBD)					
	C	D	R	C	D	R	C	D	R	C	D	R	C	D	R
Add DNSKEY records	✓	✓		✓	❑		✓	✓	✓						
Remove DNSKEY records	✓	✓		✓	❑		✓	✓	✓						
Add CDS/CDNSKEY records	✓	✓		?	❑		✓	✓	✓						
Remove CDS/CDNSKEY records	✓	✓		✓	o		✓	✓	✓						
Add CSYNC record	✓	✓		✓	❑		✓	✓	✓						
Remove CSYNC record	✓	✓		✓	❑		✓	✓	✓						

C = Command Line Interface – not usable

D = Dynamic DNS

R = Rest API

✓ **Complete**

❑ **In progress**

o **Planned but not started**

Not Planned

DNS Service Provider Capabilities

14 Oct 2021	deSEC			NS1			Neustar			(Google, Cloudflare, Akamai, Amazon, Azure, Fastly, et al, TBD)					
	C	D	R	C	D	R	C	D	R	C	D	R	C	D	R
Add DNSKEY records		✓	✓		❑	❑		❑	❑						
Remove DNSKEY records		✓	✓		❑	❑		❑	❑						
Add CDS/CDNSKEY records		✓	✓		❑	❑		❑	❑						
Remove CDS/CDNSKEY records		✓	✓		❑	❑		❑	❑						
Add CSYNC record		✓	✓		❑	❑		❑	❑						
Remove CSYNC record		✓	✓		❑	❑		❑	❑						

C = Command Line Interface – not usable

D = Dynamic DNS

R = Rest API

✓ **Complete**

❑ **In progress**

o **Planned but not started**

Not Planned

References

DNSSEC Provisioning Automation "Episodes" Standing Panel at ICANN DNSSEC Workshops

Episode	Date	Meeting	DNSSEC Provisioning Automation Sessions
1	11 Mar 2020	ICANN 67 "Cancún"	https://tinyurl.com/5dwxfz2v
2	22 Jun 2020	ICANN 68 "Kuala Lumpur"	https://tinyurl.com/m8eraezu
3	21 Oct 2020	ICANN 69 "Hamburg"	https://tinyurl.com/f8ma6347
4	24 Mar 2021	ICANN 70 "Cancún"	https://tinyurl.com/bj69sn87
5	14 Jun 2021	ICANN 71 "The Hague"	https://tinyurl.com/t2fcefr6
6	27 Oct 2021	ICANN 72 "Seattle"	

Internet Society DNSSEC Maps

https://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/dnssec/maps/

Episode 1: 20 March 2020 “Cancún”

#	Title	Speaker	TinyURL
	Steve Crocker will outline the problems and the space of possible solutions	Steve Crocker, Shinkuro, Inc	https://tinyurl.com/4w2eck8j
	DS Automation		
	Registry:	James Galvin, Afilias; Erwin Lansing, DK; and Gavin Brown, CentralNic for SK	
	Multisigner Project		
	Registrar	Brian Dickson, GoDaddy; Jothan Frakes, PLISK; and Ólafur Guðmundsson, Cloudflare	
	DNS Provider	Ólafur Guðmundsson, Cloudflare	

Episode 2: 22 June 2020 “Kuala Lumpur”

#	Title	Speaker	TinyURL
	DS Updates and Multi-Signer Coordination	Steve Crocker, Shinkuro, Inc	https://tinyurl.com/vzu58xzv
	DS Automation		
	Multi-Signer DNSSEC	Shumon Huque, Salesforce, Inc	https://tinyurl.com/6sche46m
	Multisigner Project		
	Support for Multi-Signer DNSSEC	Paul Ebersman, Neustar	https://tinyurl.com/4kmcxmfw
	GoDaddy DNSSEC Signing and DS Updates	Brian Dickson, GoDaddy	https://tinyurl.com/bev24h6u
	Managing DNSSEC via API	Jothan Frakes, PLISK	https://tinyurl.com/w6ce9mu9
	Automated DNSSEC in CZ	Jaromír Talíř, CZ.NIC	https://tinyurl.com/dphwhby4
	Support for and adoption of CDS in .CH and .LI	Oli Schacher, SWITCH	https://tinyurl.com/22c6t6sn

Episode 3: 21 October 2020 “Hamburg”

#	Title	Speaker	TinyURL
I.	Overview: Framing the Issues	Shumon Huque and Steve Crocker	https://tinyurl.com/44dttx7p
II.	• SE DNSSEC History Present Future	Ulrich Wisser, SIF*	https://tinyurl.com/35m44a67
	• Deploying DNSSEC in a Large Enterprise	Han Zhang & Allison Mankin, Salesforce	https://tinyurl.com/jn8d9cv8
	DS Automation		
III.	• DS Automation	Shumon Huque, Salesforce	https://tinyurl.com/nnma8aau
	• DS Automation: Non-technical Considerations	James Galvin Ph.D., Afilias, Inc	https://tinyurl.com/p692jjzu
	• GoDaddy DNSSEC DS – Current and Proposed DS Update Methods	Brian Dickson, GoDaddy	https://tinyurl.com/8d695va9
	• Gathering the Childrens DS’	Mark Elkins, Posix	https://tinyurl.com/59697hm5
	• Evolving the DNSSEC Deployment Maps	Dan York, Internet Society	https://tinyurl.com/ytz9xw8k
	Multisigner Project		
IV.	• DNSSEC Census: Are DNSKEY Transitions Working?	Eric Osterweil, George Mason Univ	https://tinyurl.com/7tzwr6hr
	• Automating Multiple Signers	Shumon Huque, Salesforce	https://tinyurl.com/va53mwy8
V.	• Action Items:	Steve Crocker	https://tinyurl.com/2zykj7zs

*SIF = The Swedish Internet Foundation

Episode 4: 24 March 2021 “Cancún”

#	Title	Speaker	TinyURL
4.1	Panel Overview	Steve Crocker, Shinkuro, Inc	https://tinyurl.com/msaakbud
	DS Automation		
4.2	DS Automation at GoDaddy	Brian Dickson, GoDaddy	https://tinyurl.com/hwx6hy52
	Multisigner Project		
4.3	Intro to Multisigner Project Foundations	Shumon Huque, Salesforce	https://tinyurl.com/4cwcndrr
4.4	Multisigner Protocols	Ulrich Wisser, SIF*	https://tinyurl.com/v4y727sj
4.5	Multisigner Testbed	Ulrich Wisser, SIF*	https://tinyurl.com/cm3uuhk3
4.6	Multisigner Multisigner support at deSEC	Peter Thomassen, Secure Systems Engineering	https://tinyurl.com/eyymfh2z
4.7	DNSKEY Transition Observatory	Ravichander, Osterweil, GMU	https://tinyurl.com/vdwpj4wp
4.8	Anatomy of DNSSEC Transitions	Osterweil, Tehrani, Schmidt, Waehlisch	https://tinyurl.com/ssfxwr3x

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Episode 5: 14 June 2021 “The Hague”

#	Title	Speaker	TinyURL
3.1	DNSSEC Provisioning Automation Overview	Steve Crocker, Shinkuro, Inc	https://tinyurl.com/5a66kvpx
	DS Automation		
3.2	CDS scanning at RIPE NCC	Ondřej Caletka, RIPE NCC	https://tinyurl.com/t673a7px
3.3	The State of DNSSEC Automated Provisioning	Wilco van Beijnum, University of Twente	https://tinyurl.com/ntv5um3k
	Multisigner Project		
3.4	Multi-Signer Project Overview and Status	Ulrich Wisser, SIF*	https://tinyurl.com/4uyvps4u
3.5	BIND DNSSEC Provisioning Interfaces	Matthijs Mekking, Internet Systems Consortium	https://tinyurl.com/56p3pye7
3.6	PowerDNS DNSSEC Provisioning Interfaces	Peter van Dijk, PowerDNS	https://tinyurl.com/vracytyp

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Thanks!